What about in private? Make sure there is nothing there.”. Full text of Colin Powell's speech. Numerous references to humint as fact. (E.g., “We know that…) We have been told that some are being adjusted, but we gather some others — such as information involving multiple-corroboration – will stay…In the Iraq context, “multiple corroboration” hardly guarantees authenticity of information. Colin Powell on Iraq, Race, and Hurricane Relief. National Security Agency intercepts had picked up communications between an Iraqi general and an Iraqi procurement agent who was based in Australia. After all, Hussein had violated numerous U.N. resolutions regarding his weapons program, aggression toward Kuwait and treatment of his own people. But Powell had also offered unsolicited policymaking advice to the White House and off-the-cuff troop-downsizing estimates to the press. The following morning, McLaughlin and his colleagues were sent to the Oval Office for a repeat performance, accompanied by Tenet, for a gathering that included Bush, Cheney, Rice and Libby. Rumsfeld archly replied: “Then maybe it’s not a coalition worth having.” Rumsfeld argued that a “global war on terror” should in fact be global. They included Rumsfeld’s deputy, Paul Wolfowitz; the under secretary of defense for policy, Douglas Feith; Scooter Libby, Cheney’s chief of staff; and Cheney himself. His own boss, Prime Minister Tony Blair, professed a commitment to regime change in Iraq, but one that was orderly and supported by other countries in the West as well as in the Arab world. Nov.29 -- Ret. At the U.N., Powell described a satellite picture this way: The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that the bunkers are storing chemical munitions…The truck you […] see is a signature item. That’s all it takes to support the journalism you rely on. Because this idea is so cockamamie, it’ll never happen.” Of Hussein, “Powell kept saying, ‘He’s a bad guy in a box, so let’s keep building the box,’” another one of his deputies recalled. He spoke of decontamination trucks at chemical-weapons factories, to the consternation of the chemical-weapons analyst Larry Fox, who had repeatedly warned that the speech was making too much out of what might well be innocuous vehicles but had been repeatedly overruled by his superiors. Powell’s presentation left out extremely important information, as here: POWELL: Iraq’s record on chemical weapons is replete with lies. Their memo of objections to Hannah’s weapons section on Jan. 31 came to six single-spaced pages and cited at least 38 items that were deemed either “weak” or “unsubstantiated.” The I.N.R. “Nice try,” the president said to McLaughlin. The fact that such a presentation was being ordered up was tantamount to a White House vote of no confidence in Blix. But while spending Thanksgiving with Army troops at Fort Campbell in Kentucky, the president proclaimed, “Afghanistan is just the beginning of the war on terror.”, A month later, Bush was briefed by Gen. Tommy Franks of U.S. Central Command on a possible plan for invading Iraq. He owed his career to Rumsfeld, whose coattails had carried him from the Office of Economic Opportunity to the Ford White House in 1974. The analysts had noted what seemed to be recent suspicious movement of vehicles around suspected chemical-weapons plants. that the White House wanted it to prepare an oral presentation on Iraq’s weapons program that would feature an “Adlai Stevenson moment” — referring to the 1962 episode in which the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. presented open-and-shut photographic evidence of Soviet ballistic-missile installations in Cuba. Following is a transcript of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the U.N. Security Council on the U.S. case against Iraq. “My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources,” Powell said in his calm, sonorous baritone. As an intelligence official — one of many who spoke to me on the condition of anonymity — said: “We knew where we were headed, and that was war. A NYT Magazine piece on Colin Powell and the case to invade Iraq highlights an NIE that was prepared not to determine the truth, but rather to “justify” preemptive war on Iraq, where there was nothing to preempt. But if he were to do so, Powell added, there was a chance that Hussein would surrender his weapons. John Hannah, Cheney’s assistant for national security affairs, was tasked with the section on biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. At the beginning of one meeting, Richard Armitage, Powell’s deputy secretary, genially offered the vice president some coffee. There’s no way someone came in and cleaned that place out. They were later quietly released as appendices to the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on WMD intelligence. Powell thought such an invasion would be disastrous — and yet the prospect had for months seemed so preposterous to Powell and his deputies at the State Department that he assumed it would burn out of its own accord. Sometime in May 2002, Bush received a Presidential Daily Briefing from the C.I.A. headquarters with his speechwriting team. He mournfully predicted to others that his obituary’s first paragraph would include his authorship of the U.N. speech. “If Powell had decided to resign in advance of the Iraq war,” Straw told me, “I would almost certainly have done so, too.” Blair’s support in the Labour Party would have cratered — and had Blair withdrawn his support for war under pressure from Parliament or simply failed to win an authorization vote, the narrative of collapsed momentum would have dominated the news coverage for weeks. But by the summer of 2002, this argument was clearly losing ground. ABC News. And so I think that’s when he really starts thinking, I’ve got to get something done in Iraq.”. “You have to take this seriously,” the foreign minister said, “because there are contrary voices. POWELL: We know that Saddam’s son, Qusay, ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam’s numerous palace complexes. The only question to him was whether the C.I.A. WEAK. Clearly, Powell’s loyalty to Bush extended to being willing to deceive the world: the United Nations, Americans, and the coalition troops about to be sent to kill and die in Iraq. In a speech in Cincinnati in October 2002, Bush likened America’s confrontation with Hussein to World War II — an indicator that the president could not foresee a diplomatic outcome. “Eric,” Edelman recalled him asking, “has the president already decided to go to war, and we’re just in this interagency circle jerk?”, “I don’t think the president has decided to go to war,” Edelman replied. … the claim that experts agree UAVs fitted with spray tanks are “an ideal method for launching a terrorist attack using biological weapons” is WEAK. “You guys really believe all this [expletive]?” he scoffed to one of Cheney’s deputies. Throw it on the floor.”, To the outside observer, the process seemed methodical and professional. The house belonged to the billionaire Ronald Lauder, who for most of August was hosting his good friend and Straw’s American counterpart, Colin Powell. Following the passage of Resolution 1441, on 18 November 2002, weapons inspectors of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission returned to Iraq for the first time since being withdrawn by the United Nations. Maybe Iraqis just manufacture their conventional weapons to a higher standard than we do, but I don’t think so. Trump reminds Colin Powell of the Iraq war 07.06.2020 US President Donald Trump responded to former Secretary of State Colin Powell, who said he would vote for Joe Biden in the upcoming presidential election, and reminded him of the catastrophic wars of the Middle East. On Dec. 19, Henoch argued this point to Slick. This claim is highly questionable and promises to be targeted by critics and possibly UN inspection officials as well. It was arguably the most important message that Bush would hear from any of his subordinates in his entire presidency — and, in what Powell left out of the message, the most important missed opportunity. Le secrétaire d'Etat américain Colin POWELL a prononcé aujourd'hui un discours attendu devant le conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, concernant les preuves des liens du régime irakien avec Al -Qaïda, ainsi que la détention par l'Irak d'armes de destruction massive. Colin Powell has called his 2003 speech to the United Nations, laying out the Bush administration’s rationale for war in Iraq, a “blot” on his record. Irak : Ce que Colin Powell savait et ce qu’il a dit aux Nations Unies. analysts to argue why any of it should be thrown out. KAMEL: No. IRAK - Colin Powell exige des réponses sur les fausses informations L'ancien secrétaire d'État américain avait affirmé à l'ONU que Saddam Hussein disposait d'armes de … Later, regarding whether Iraq had reconstituted a nuclear weapons program, he said: That’s in public. As it turned out, the secretary’s voice was the most prescient in the Bush administration. According to Larry Wilkerson, Powell’s chief of staff, here’s what Powell was thinking at the time: WILKERSON: [Powell] had walked into my office musing and he said words to the effect of, ‘I wonder how we’ll all feel if we put half a million troops in Iraq and march from one end of the country to the other and find nothing.’. Je Tweet. He’s the president.”, “I’m sort of not the resigning type,” Straw said. The speech remains one of the most indelible public moments of the Bush presidency. On Tuesday, it was Colin Powell, George W. Bush’s Republican secretary of state who played an instrumental role in leading America into war with Iraq. The speech set out to detail Iraq’s … As the secretary told one of his top aides: “The vice president said to me: ‘You’re the most popular man in America. ‘‘He’s the president.’’Credit...Gabriella Demczuk for The New York Times. With the benefit of 15 years of hindsight, it’s possible to see Powell’s U.N. speech as a signal event in the broader story of American governance. “This is all there is?” he asked when they convened again. He spoke of one of Curveball’s confirming sources, “an Iraqi major” — surprising a Defense Intelligence Agency staff member watching the speech who, months earlier, had interviewed the major and determined him to be a fabricator. Meanwhile, Powell’s chief of staff, Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, was also hashing out the text on weapons with Hannah. This is some of what Powell said about the infamous aluminum tubes purchased by Iraq, supposedly meant for their covert nuclear weapons program: POWELL: It strikes me as quite odd that these [aluminum] tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets. Powell initially opposed deposing Saddam, but he ultimately acquiesced to Shrub's demands. As much criticism as Powell has gotten for this — he calls it “painful” and says, “I get mad when bloggers accuse me of lying” — it hasn’t been close to what he deserves. D'origine afro-caribéenne, il naît dans une famille d'immigrants jamaïcains et est élevé dans le quartier du South Bronx à New York. This domino effect required a first move by Bush’s secretary of state. Cheney and Rumsfeld are in a different place. The New York Times Magazine on Friday posted “Colin Powell Still Wants Answers,” a long article by Robert Draper to appear in Sunday’s edition. And as the elder Bush’s defense secretary, Cheney watched attentively as his Joint Chiefs chairman hoovered up publicity. director said that he did. The new president was far more conservative, far less reverential of international alliances. “And the obvious answer was Colin Powell, chief diplomat.”, “Are you with me on this?” Bush asked Powell. He shared Powell’s views on the folly of invasion. But he has not attended the administration’s annual alumni gatherings, and since leaving office he has refused to defend Bush’s legacy-defining decision to invade Iraq. However, when he translated what they were saying, he knowingly embellished it, turning it from evidence Iraq was complying with U.N. resolutions to evidence Iraq was violating them. The C.I.A. The first INR memo, from January 29, 2003, flagged this claim as “WEAK”: second bullet. second bullet. But that distinction had become lost by the time Powell spoke before the U.N. What we’re giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. In the Principals Committee meetings, men who had known one another for decades could no longer disguise their ill feelings. The sources in the text weren’t footnoted, and Wilkerson grimaced as he watched Hannah fumble through his binders. More notable, the political side of the White House — including Karl Rove, Bush’s longtime adviser, and Dan Bartlett, his communications director — was now hearing the intelligence case against Hussein for the very first time. Even Cheney had explicitly acknowledged that Powell was the right man for the job. Doubters in the upper ranks of the American military — there were several — would have been empowered to speak out; intelligence would have been re-examined; Democrats, now liberated from the political pressures of the midterm elections, would most likely have joined the chorus. Powell viewed the document suspiciously. Part 1: Introduction Thank you, Mr. President. "Une tache dans ma carrière", dit-il aujourd'hui. “This is a rough draft — it’s still in development,” McLaughlin began. Jon Schwarz[email protected]​theintercept.com@Schwarz. Alone among the president’s war council, the four-star general was seen by Republicans and Democrats, the news media and the public as a figure of unassailable credibility. McLaughlin reviewed them with astonishment. Colin Powell lors de son célèbre discours à l'ONU, le 5 février 2003, présente "les preuves" sur les armes de destruction massive. The analysts sent up what visuals they had. … Make sure there is nothing there.” None of this was in the intercept. Colin Powell on Iraq 2001: Counseled against Iraq at same time as Afghanistan Saddam's brutal dictatorship was widely considered the most dangerous country in the world. Gen. Colin Powell discusses the Iraq War and his presentation to the United Nations. And he spoke of aluminum tubes that “most experts think” were to be used for uranium enrichment — ignoring his department’s own experts, including the I.N.R.’s director, Carl Ford, who became heartsick watching Powell on TV and informed the secretary three months later that he was resigning. This appears in Bob Woodward’s book “Plan of Attack”: Powell had decided to add his personal interpretation of the intercepts to the rehearsed script, taking them substantially further and casting them in the most negative light. Defer to headquarters, but to use information from another liaison service’s source whose information cannot be verified on such an important, key topic should take the most serious consideration.”, Powell knew nothing about these serious concerns. Bush and the others listened intently. Consider what the world of media would look like without The Intercept. As measured and even-tempered as Tenet was mercurial, he wore natty suspenders but was otherwise a by-the-book professional who pored over classified documents with a ruler, sliding it slowly downward line by line. In Curveball, they saw a liar. last bullet. “Bob?” she said with evident concern. For 10 years, it was our pretty strong judgment that Saddam had chemical capability.” Whether or not this was still true, “with American soldiers about to go in, we weren’t going to change our mind and say, ‘Never mind.’”. To the caucus, he said: “You may not trust Dick Cheney. Just a couple of minutes into his summary, Rice stopped him. If Powell said Hussein presented an immediate danger to the United States, then surely it was so. When another C.I.A. This was, I learned, typical of the prewar intelligence estimates: They amounted to semi-educated guesses built on previous and seldom-challenged guesses that always assumed the worst and imagined deceptiveness in everything the Iraqi regime did. WEAK. Libby’s team had claimed that a shipment of aluminum tubes that the C.I.A. Colin Powell was initiated as an honorary brother in Sigma Phi Epsilon. The timing of the request seemed odd, given that Hans Blix, the U.N.’s chief weapons inspector, and his team were already in Iraq and would presumably be furnishing on-the-ground visual proof of Hussein’s arsenal, if it existed, any day now. As you can see in the video, Powell was not happy to explore this line of questioning. HUSSEINI: You didn’t know that, even though it was reported? Wielding dramatic satellite photos and intelligence intercepts, he cited “irrefutable and undeniable” evidence that Iraq still conceals massive quantities of terror weapons. If the State Department’s top team had emptied out their desks, what would Powell’s close friend Straw have done? McLaughlin tried again. The second INR memo, written on February 3, 2003, told Powell this: Our key remaining concern is the claim that the tubes are manufactured to a tolerance that “far exceeds U.S. requirements for comparable rockets.” In fact, the most comparable U.S. system is a tactical rocket — the U.S. Mark 66 air-launched 70mm rocket — that uses the same, high-grade (7075-T6) aluminum, and that has specifications with similar tolerances. This is all part of a system of hiding things and moving things out of the way and making sure they have left nothing behind. The Iraqi was stunned. Iraqi intelligence officials posing as WMD scientists. The expert’s mouth opened when Powell displayed photographs of trucks moving into a suspected weapons of mass destruction bunker hours before an inspection team was due to visit, followed by a photo of the inspectors filing through a now-empty bunker. During the gulf war, his poise and resolve on television rallied Americans leery of foreign entanglements after the horror of Vietnam. The kind of reporting we do is essential to democracy, but it is not easy, cheap, or profitable. What could go wrong? Such a coalition, achieved through the passage of a United Nations resolution, might persuade Saddam Hussein to comply with weapons inspectors and avoid military confrontation. It was precisely the secretary of state’s skepticism about the wisdom of war that made him the Bush White House’s indispensable pitchman for it. Since the State Department was questioned about this by journalist Gilbert Cranberg, the translation at variance with Powell’s version has disappeared from its site. At Camp David, Wolfowitz went so far as to argue that Hussein was most likely behind the Sept. 11 attacks. In August 2018, in the course of researching a book on the lead-up to the Iraq war, I went to see Powell at the office in Alexandria, Va., that he has maintained since leaving the Bush administration in early 2005. 101 is you don’t help them make the case,” said an agency official who was involved in the project. Rumsfeld was not Powell’s only rival in the room. By contrast, Powell’s team found it highly unlikely that Hussein would consort with Islamic terrorists who despised the secular Iraqi regime. Some of the most arresting visuals in the Case — the only ones that seemed to catch the attention of the Pentagon officials during McLaughlin’s early rehearsal of the C.I.A.’s presentation — were photographs of a vehicle believed to be an Iraqi mobile biological-weapons lab. It took years for Iraq to finally admit that it had produced 4 tons of the deadly nerve agent, VX. Then they lied about ever producing it (until his defection). Thus the U.S. could safely take a witness who truthfully had said Iraq had no remaining banned weapons and pretend his testimony indicated the exact opposite. Here’s what the CIA’s report on Iraq’s nonexistent weapons of mass destruction found out about what was going on within the Iraqi government just before the January 30 intercepted conversation: The NMD director met with Republican Guard military leaders on 25 January 2003 and advised them they were to sign documents saying that there was no WMD in their units, according to a former Iraqi senior officer. All other sources are linked below. He was, as a top National Security Council staff member who respected Powell would recall, “more of a dissident, who,” as the administration drifted steadily toward confrontation with Hussein, “would say, ‘I’m fighting a rear-guard action against these [expletive] crazies.’”. Colin Powell delivered his presentation, making a case for war with Iraq at the United Nations on February 5, 2003. It’s unclear. at the time. During his presentation he stated that he believed "without a doubt Sadd… “What should I do?” Bush asked. Sensitive files being driven around in cars, in apparent shell game. They directly contradicted Powell on the aluminum tubes issue, but also warned him many of his claims were “weak,” “not credible,” or “highly questionable.” Here are some of the examples the memos give. This was not an academic argument. “George was on the team, and that itself is an issue,” Wippl would later reflect. Once the decision was made that Powell would deliver the U.N. speech, he was handed the text that Libby’s team had prepared. He left it four years later, discarded by Bush in favor of a more like-minded chief diplomat, Condoleezza Rice. On the evening of Feb. 4 at U.N. headquarters, Powell went over his speech one final time. “But not for long.” In his ascent to chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President George H.W. I left thinking, OK, I feel good about this.”. “But I do think the president has decided the problem Saddam presents can’t just drag on forever.”. It was to that question — not, as often reported, a question relating to whether Hussein posed a threat — that the C.I.A. Line by line, data point by data point, the secretary read out the text and then asked: “Does that sound right? It’s now available only via archive.org. Colin Powell in Virginia this month. ), with reviewing the speech’s claims on biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. … Concerning the intercept about inspecting for the possibility of “forbidden ammo,” Powell took the interpretation further: “Clean out all of the areas. Smirking, he replied, “You might tell them I’m curious about it.”. had intercepted on its way to Iraq in 2001 was intended for use in uranium-enrichment centrifuges (a claim that was leaked to The New York Times). Bush also understood the power that Powell’s popularity conferred on him, and he knew that Powell, who had once considered and decided against running for president, could change his mind anytime he wished. It is Exhibit A for the argument that would help propel Donald Trump to the White House in 2016 — that the U.S. government was not on the level, that the “establishment” figures of both parties were at once fools and manipulators. Do something with that popularity.’” But, Powell added to his aide, he wasn’t sure he could say no to Bush anyway. Commanders established committees to ensure their units retained no evidence of old WMD. (He’s also never shown any inclination to find out who purportedly steered him wrong; when asked by Barbara Walters who was responsible for the mistakes in the overall presentation, Powell stated, “I don’t have the names.”). The U.N. was the aggrieved party. In the audience in the Security Council chamber was a young U.N. weapons inspector named Dawson Cagle, who had recently returned from Baghdad. For the next two weeks, several analysts fine-tuned the presentation. Two C.I.A.

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