For di Piacenza, who taught that the ideal smoothness of dance movement could only be attained by a balance of qualities, relied on Aristotelian philosophical concepts of movement, measure and memory to extol dance on moral grounds, as a virtue. And because happiness is being described as a work or function of humans, we can say that just as we contrast harpists with serious harpists, the person who lives well and beautifully in this actively rational and virtuous way will be a "serious" (spoudaios) human.[27][28]. But Aristotle points to a simplification in this idea of hitting a mean. The opposite is rare, and therefore there is no special name for a person insensitive to pleasures and delight. aristote . [84] The problem with this approach to justice, although it is normal in politics and law-making, is that it ignores the difference between different reasons for doing a crime. Aristotle points out that this is a very specific realm of honesty, that which concerns oneself. To truly be a virtuous person, one's virtuous actions must meet three conditions: (a) they are done knowingly, (b) they are chosen for their own sakes, and (c) they are chosen according to a stable disposition (not at a whim, or in any way that the acting person might easily change his choice about). Point de destinée ou de hasard heureux, donc. The human good is a practical target, and contrasts with Plato's references to "the Good itself". An overconfident person might stand a while when things do not turn out as expected, but a person confident out of ignorance is likely to run at the first signs of such things. A truly courageous person is not certain of victory and does endure fear. [37]) People become habituated well by first performing actions that are virtuous, possibly because of the guidance of teachers or experience, and in turn these habitual actions then become real virtue where we choose good actions deliberately. Aristotle discusses this subject further in Book VII. In contrast, the ambitious man would get this balance wrong by seeking excess honor from the inappropriate sources, and the unambitious man would not desire appropriately to be honored for noble reasons. If happiness is virtue, or a certain virtue, then it must not just be a condition of being virtuous, potentially, but an actual way of virtuously "being at work" as a human. First, what is good or bad need not be good or bad simply, but can be good or bad for a certain person at a certain time. Le corpus aristotélicien comprend traditionnellement trois ensembles consacrés à la philosophie morale : l' Éthique à Nicomaque , l' Éthique à Eudème et la Grande Morale, ou Grands Livres d'Éthique , dont l'attribution à Aristote (385 env.-322 env. In his Metaphysics, Aristotle described how Socrates, the friend and teacher of Plato, had turned philosophy to human questions, whereas pre-Socratic philosophy had only been theoretical. (1131a23-24). The answer according to Aristotle is that it must involve articulate speech (logos), including both being open to persuasion by reasoning, and thinking things through. They are not apt to complain about necessities or small matters, nor to ask for help, not wanting to imply that such things are important to them. Des deux premiers, les titres sont mystérieux, et certain Une des citations majeures d’Aristote issues de l’Ethique est : “Celui qui ne peut pas vivre en société, ou qui n’a besoin de rien parce qu’il se suffit à lui-même, ne fait point partie de l’Etat; c’est une brute ou un dieu”. Men are sometimes even called courageous just for enduring pain. The definition itself is very important to the whole work. "Non-voluntary" or "non willing" actions (. The way children act also has some likeness to the vice of akolasia. The first part relates to members of a community in which it is possible for one person to have more or less of a good than another person. Having virtue but being inactive, even suffering evils and misfortunes, which Aristotle says no one would consider unless they were defending a hypothesis. (§ 1-20 : 1094a 1 – 1095a 11) The courage of citizen soldiers. The second part of particular justice is rectificatory and it consists of the voluntary and involuntary. seulement à cause d’elle, et si nous ne choisissons pas w indéfiniment une chose en vue d’une autre (car on procéderait ainsi à l’infini, de sorte que le désir serait futile et vain), il est clair que cette fin-là ne saurait être que le bien, le Souverain Bien. Aristotelian Ethics is about what makes a virtuous character (ethikē aretē) possible, which is in turn necessary if happiness is to be possible. [95] His way of accommodating Socrates relies on the distinction between knowledge that is activated or not, for example in someone drunk or enraged. But regarding pains, temperance is different from courage. Aristotle also points out that "generous people are loved practically the most of those who are recognized for virtue, since they confer benefits, and this consists in giving" and he does not deny that generous people often won't be good at maintaining their wealth, and are often easy to cheat. Pour aller plus loin sur Aristote et l’éthique à Nicomaque : Votre adresse e-mail ne sera pas publiée. The main stream of discussion starts from the well-known opening of Chapter 1, with the assertion that all technical arts, all investigations (every methodos, including the Ethics itself), indeed all deliberate actions and choice, all aim at some good apart from themselves. Aristotle goes further in this direction by saying that it might seem that it is better to be wasteful than to be stingy: a wasteful person is cured by age, and by running out of resources, and if they are not merely unrestrained people then they are foolish rather than vicious and badly brought-up. J.-C.) est aujourd'hui très contestée. 3Ethique à Nicomaque, I, 1, 1094 b, 14-16 (pp. Aristotle reviews various opinions held about self-mastery, most importantly one he associates with Socrates. Lire en ligne Éthique à Nicomaque livre PDF téléchargeable gratuitement ici en PDF. One is through excitability, where a person does not wait for reason but follows the imagination, often having not been prepared for events. (In contrast to politics and warfare it does not involve doing things we'd rather not do, but rather something we do at our leisure.) Being skilled in an art can also be described as a mean between excess and deficiency: when they are well done we say that we would not want to take away or add anything from them. The slavish way of pleasure, which is the way the majority of people think of happiness. Aristotle does not deny anger a place in the behavior of a good person, but says it should be "on the right grounds and against the right persons, and also in the right manner and at the right moment and for the right length of time". In chapter 11 Aristotle goes through some of the things said about pleasure and particularly why it might be bad. On peut entendre l’amitié comme une relation d’affection réciproque entre deux personnes. The second set of examples of moral virtues, A balanced ambitiousness concerning smaller honors, Something like friendship, between being obsequious and surly, Honesty about oneself: the virtue between boasting and self-deprecation, Book V: Justice and fairness: a moral virtue needing special discussion, Book VII. The section is yet another explanation of why the Ethics will not start from first principles, which would mean starting out by trying to discuss "The Good" as a universal thing that all things called good have in common. To describe more clearly what happiness is like, Aristotle next asks what the work (ergon) of a human is. But seeing, for example is a whole, as is the associated pleasure. Aristotle then turns to examples, reviewing some of the specific ways that people are thought worthy of blame or praise. He contrasts this with desire, which he says does not obey reason, although it is frequently responsible for the weaving of unjust plots. They are apt to act more high-handedly to a person of high station than a person of middle or low standing, which would be below them. Aristotle said in Book II that—with the moral virtues such as courage—the extreme one's normal desires tend away from are the most important to aim towards. They are frank in expressing opinions and open about what they hate and love. Some other translations:-, σπουδαίου δ᾽ ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς. It therefore indirectly became critical in the development of all modern philosophy as well as European law and theology. [111], At the next level, friendships of pleasure are based on fleeting emotions and are associated with young people. In contrast, an excessive tendency or vice concerning anger would be irascibility or quickness to anger. He adds that it is only concerned with pains in a lesser and different way. Such a person judges according to right reason (orthos logos). By itself this would make life choiceworthy and lacking nothing. [36], Trying to follow the method of starting with approximate things gentlemen can agree on, and looking at all circumstances, Aristotle says that we can describe virtues as things that are destroyed by deficiency or excess. Aristotle reminds us here that he has already said that moral dispositions (hexeis) are caused by the activities (energeia) we perform, meaning that a magnificent person's virtue can be seen from the way he chooses the correct magnificent acts at the right times. While parents often attempt to do this, it is critical that there are also good laws in the community. Pleasure is discussed throughout the whole Ethics, but is given a final more focused and theoretical treatment in Book X. Aristotle starts by questioning the rule of thumb accepted in the more approximate early sections, whereby people think pleasure should be avoided—if not because it is bad simply, then because people tend too much towards pleasure seeking. [51] Courage, however, is not thought to relate to fear of evil things it is right to fear, like disgrace—and courage is not the word for a man who does not fear danger to his wife and children, or punishment for breaking the law. [12] The four virtues that he says require the possession of all the ethical virtues together are: (In the Eudemian Ethics (Book VIII, chapter 3) Aristotle also uses the word "kalokagathia", the nobility of a gentleman (kalokagathos), to describe this same concept of a virtue containing all the moral virtues. According to Aristotle the potential for this virtue is by nature in humans, but whether virtues come to be present or not is not determined by human nature. Stubborn people are actually more like a person without self-mastery, because they are partly led by the pleasure coming from victory. [72] The virtue of praótēs is the correct mean concerning anger. Chapter 1 distinguishes actions chosen as relevant to virtue, and whether actions are to be blamed, forgiven, or even pitied. [126], Defining "Flourishing" (eudaimonia) and the aim of the, Questions that might be raised about the definition, From defining happiness to discussion of virtue: introduction to the rest of the Ethics, Books II–V: Concerning excellence of character or moral virtue, Book II: That virtues of character can be described as means, Book III. Burger (2008) points out that although the chapter nominally follows the same path (methodos) as previous chapters "it is far from obvious how justice is to be understood as a disposition in relation to a passion: the proposed candidate, greed (pleonexia), would seem to refer, rather, to the vice of injustice and the single opposite of the virtue." Virtue and vice according to Aristotle are "up to us". Indeed, they do few things, and are slow to start on things, unless there is great honor involved. This raises the question of why play and bodily pleasures cannot be happiness, because for example tyrants sometimes choose such lifestyles. The deficient vice would be found in people who won't defend themselves. [106], Chapter 13 starts from pain, saying it is clearly bad, either in a simple sense or as an impediment to things. Such relationships are rare, because good people are rare, and bad people do not take pleasure in each other. La vertu doit être pratiquée de manière continuelle, et non pas épisodique. Apart from natural depravities and cases where a bodily pleasure comes from being restored to health Aristotle asserts a more complex metaphysical reason, which is that for humans change is sweet, but only because of some badness in us, which is that part of every human has a perishable nature, and "a nature that needs change [..] is not simple nor good". He reviews some arguments of previous philosophers, including first Eudoxus and Plato, to argue that pleasure is clearly a good pursued for its own sake even if it is not The Good, or in other words that which all good things have in common. As an example of popular opinions about happiness, Aristotle cites an "ancient one and agreed to by the philosophers". La modération des commentaires est activée. However, while such friends do like to be together, such friendships also end easily whenever people no longer enjoy the shared activity, or can no longer participate in it together. La première est une vertu ; la seconde concerne les lois et relève de la raison. For Aristotle, akrasia, "unrestraint", is distinct from animal-like behavior because it is specific to humans and involves conscious rational thinking about what to do, even though the conclusions of this thinking are not put into practice. It extends previously developed discussions, especially from the end of Book II, in relation to vice akolasia and the virtue of sophrosune. Aristotle also remarks that "rash" people (thrasus), those with excessive confidence, are generally cowards putting on a brave face. De la juste mesure des chiffres et des dettes contre l’actuelle nouvelle chrématistique | Calami, ite ! [113], Book IX and the last sections of Book VIII turn to the question of how friends and partners generally should reward each other and treat each other, whether it be in money or honor or pleasure. [5] Scholars, in recent years, have used the Eudemian Ethics as support, confirmation, and sometimes foil for NE. These in turn can allow the development of a good stable character in which the habits are voluntary, and this in turn gives a chance of achieving eudaimonia. Cet extrait de L’Ethique à Nicomaque, écrit par Aristote, porte sur le thème de l’amitié. nos société politiques s’en porteraient bien mieux, je un essai de solution sur le Bien selon Platon et Aristote. L'énumération un peu scolaire des vertus et des vices peut paraître parfois ennuyeuse mais lorsqu'on arrive à la dernière partie, on comprend toute la cohérence et la puissance de l'ensemble. La dernière modification de cette page a été faite le 18 décembre 2019 à 15:46. » Dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque, Aristote expose, en dix livres, l’accès à la sagesse et au bonheur individuel et collectif. Book V is the same as Book IV of the Eudemian Ethics, the first of three books common to both works. Aristotle now deals separately with some of the specific character virtues, in a form similar to the listing at the end of Book II, starting with courage and temperance. On Youth, Old Age, Life and Death, and Respiration, "The boundaries of right and wrong – Learning and the human brain", Diglossa.org/Aristotle/Ethics: multi-language library, PDFs of several (now) public domain translations and commentaries on the, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Nicomachean_Ethics&oldid=1021562047, Articles containing Ancient Greek (to 1453)-language text, Articles with dead external links from December 2016, Articles with dead external links from July 2018, Articles with permanently dead external links, Wikipedia articles with WorldCat-VIAF identifiers, Wikipedia articles with multiple identifiers, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License, scarcely occurs, but we may call it Insensible (, giving and getting (smaller amounts of) money, prodigality (Rackham), wastefulness (Sachs) (, Paltriness (Rackham), Chintziness (Sachs) (, no special term in ancient Greek for the right amount of ambition, Irascibility (Rackham), Irritability (Sachs) (, Self-deprecation: pretense as understatement (, Being of "great soul" (magnanimity), the virtue where someone would be truly deserving of the highest praise and have a correct attitude towards the honor this may involve. Articles Philo les plus lus de 2011 - Oeuvres De Philosophie. Propulsé par WordPress - La-Philosophie.com - 2008-2020. De plus il n’y a jamais de réponse complète en philosophie. For one swallow does not make a summer, Thomson: the conclusion is that the good for man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue, or if there are more kinds of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect kind. Amitié et Philosophie « Vive les Copains… et la Musique! Only many great misfortunes will limit how blessed such a life can be, but "even in these circumstances something beautiful shines through". The work, which plays a pre-eminent role in defining Aristotelian ethics, consists of ten books, originally separate scrolls, and is understood to be based on notes from his lectures at the Lyceum. [123], Turning to happiness then, the aim of the whole Ethics; according to the original definition of Book I it is the activity or being-at-work chosen for its own sake by a morally serious and virtuous person. Someone who runs away becomes a coward, while someone who fears nothing is rash. av. Once again turning to the divinity of happiness Aristotle distinguishes virtue and happiness saying that virtue, through which people "become apt at performing beautiful actions" is praiseworthy, while happiness is something more important, like god, "since every one of us does everything else for the sake of this, and we set down the source and cause of good things as something honored and divine". [97] Aristotle says that "every sort of senselessness or cowardice or dissipation or harshness that goes to excess is either animal-like or disease-like".[98]. As Sachs points out, (2002, p. 30) it appears the list is not especially fixed, because it differs between the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics, and also because Aristotle repeats several times that this is a rough outline.[44]. One whereby we contemplate or observe the things with invariable causes, One whereby we contemplate the variable things—the part with which we deliberate concerning actions. [108], Book II Chapter 6 discussed a virtue like friendship. 18 Quizz de Philosophie gratuits : Testez-vous ! Chapter 11. Finally, Aristotle repeats that the discussion of the Ethics has not reached its aim if it has no effect in practice. But those who are concerned with pleasures of the soul, honor, learning, for example, or even excessive pleasure in talking, are not usually referred to as the objects of being temperate or dissipate. Chapters 11–14: Pleasure as something to avoid, Books VIII and IX: Friendship and partnership, Book X: Pleasure, happiness, and up-bringing, Book X. Once again, Aristotle said that he had no convenient Greek word to give to the virtuous and honest mean in this case, but a person who boasts claims qualities inappropriately, while a person who self-deprecates excessively makes no claim to qualities they have, or even disparages himself. Aristotle proposes as a solution to this that pleasure is pursued because of desire to live. Books VIII and IX are continuous, but the break makes the first book focus on friendship as a small version of the political community, in which a bond stronger than justice holds people together, while the second treats it as an expansion of the self, through which all one's powers can approach their highest development. [102] Nevertheless, it is better to have akrasia than the true vice of akolasia, where intemperate choices are deliberately chosen for their own sake. Courage means holding a mean position in one's feelings of confidence and fear. As long as both friends keep similarly virtuous characters, the relationship will endure and be pleasant and useful and good for both parties, since the motive behind it is care for the friend themselves, and not something else. En bref, Aristote pose la question de la vertu : Comment doit-on agir ? [96], Aristotle makes a nature and nurture distinction between different causes of bestial behavior he says occurs "in some cases from natural disposition, and in others from habit, as with those who have been abused from childhood." It is sometimes possible that at least in the case of people who are friends for pleasure familiarity will lead to a better type of friendship, as the friends learn to admire each other's characters. The treatment of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics is longer than that of any other topic, and comes just before the conclusion of the whole inquiry. La morale d’Aristote est une philosophie de l’action, du résultat (“le bien, c’est la fin”), et non de l’intention, comme plus tard chez Kant. But he says that it seems that if anything at all gets through to the deceased, whether good or the reverse, it would be something faint and small. This rule should be applied to rectify both voluntary and involuntary transactions.[83]. In the last chapters of this book (12 and 13) Aristotle compares the importance of practical wisdom (phronesis) and wisdom (sophia). But achieving this supreme condition is inseparable from achieving all the virtues of character, or "moral virtues". But not everyone has the same particular manifestations of these desires. The obsequious (areskos) person is over-concerned with the pain they cause others, backing down too easily, even when it is dishonorable or harmful to do so, while a surly (duskolos) or quarrelsome (dusteris) person objects to everything and does not care what pain they cause others, never compromising. He refers to these as animal-like and disease-like conditions. "(1131a) The just must fall between what is too much and what is too little and the just requires the distribution to be made between people of equal stature. Although the word magnanimity has a traditional connection to Aristotelian philosophy, it also has its own tradition in English, which now causes some confusion. “Elle est ce qu’il y a de plus nécessaire pour vivre. Earlier in both works, both the Nicomachean Ethics Book IV, and the equivalent book in the Eudemian Ethics (Book III), though different, ended by stating that the next step was to discuss justice. Book IV Chapter 7. [17] Aristotle also does this himself, and though he professes to work differently from Plato by trying to start with what well-brought up men would agree with, by book VII Aristotle eventually comes to argue that the highest of all human virtues is itself not practical, being contemplative wisdom (theōria 1177a). Aristotle also focuses on the question of what the greatest things one may be worthy of. Aristotle points to the fact that many aims are really only intermediate aims, and are desired only because they make the achievement of higher aims possible. Recognizing the mean means recognizing the correct boundary-marker (horos) which defines the frontier of the mean. Indeed, as Burger point out, the approach is also quite different from previous chapters in the way it categorizes in terms of general principles, rather than building up from commonly accepted opinions. The title is often assumed to refer to his son Nicomachus, to whom the work was dedicated or who may have edited it (although his young age makes this less likely). Not to be so would be due to fear, or the esteem one has of other's opinions over your own. There is one further qualification: in a complete lifetime. Stinginess is most obviously taking money too seriously, but wastefulness, less strictly speaking, is not always the opposite (an under estimation of the importance of money) because it is also often caused by being unrestrained. Such study should, he says, even help in communities where the laws are not good and the parents need to try to create the right habits in young people themselves without the right help from lawmakers. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα. It is suggested that around three NE books were lost and were replaced by three parallel works from the Eudemian Ethics, explaining the overlap. This in turn returns Aristotle to mention the fact that laws are not normally exactly the same as what is just: "Political Justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional. Having said this however, most people we call wasteful are not only wasteful in the sense opposed to being generous, but also actually unrestrained and have many vices at once. "[87] He believed people can generally see which types of rules are conventional, and which by nature—and he felt that most important when trying to judge whether someone was just or unjust was determining whether someone did something voluntarily or not. [39] When a person does virtuous actions, for example by chance, or under advice, they are not yet necessarily a virtuous person. Aristote pose que le Bien est le but suprême de la vie, et le Bien est l’objet de la Politique : “Et puisque la Politique se sert des autres sciences pratiques et qu’en outre elle légifère sur ce qu’il faut faire et sur ce dont il faut s’abstenir, la fin de cette science englobera les fins des autres sciences ; d’où il résulte que la fin de la Politique sera le bien proprement humain Même si, en effet, il y a identité entre le bien de l’individu et celui de la cité, de toute façon c’est une tâche manifestement plus importante et plus parfaite d’appréhender et de sauvegarder le bien de la cité : carie bien est assurément aimable même pour un individu isolé, mais il est plus beau et plus divin appliqué à une nation ou à des cités.Voilà donc les buts de notre enquête, qui constitue une forme de politique”. Une communauté injuste ne peut être heureuse, autrement dit. Aristotle says that whereas virtue of thinking needs teaching, experience and time, virtue of character (moral virtue) comes about as a consequence of following the right habits. la philosophie est une science de reflexion qui nécessite une pation dans la lecture.un bon philosophe est celui que pause autants des question.car en philosophie les question sont plus inportante que des reponses, altesse mounganga. He concludes what is now known as Chapter 2 of Book 1 by stating that ethics ("our investigation" or methodos) is "in a certain way political". Chapter 6 contains a famous digression in which Aristotle appears to question his "friends" who "introduced the forms". To understand how justice aims at what is good, it is necessary to look beyond particular good or bad things we might want or not want a share of as individuals, and this includes considering the viewpoint of a community (the subject of Aristotle's Politics). Finally, he asks why people are so attracted to bodily pleasures. Although Aristotle describes sophia as more serious than practical judgement, because it is concerned with higher things, he mentions the earlier philosophers, Anaxagoras and Thales, as examples proving that one can be wise, having both knowledge and intellect, and yet devoid of practical judgement. According to Aristotle, "there are many who can practise virtue in their own private affairs but cannot do so in their relations with another". More recent authors influenced by this work include Alasdair MacIntyre, G. E. M. Anscombe, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Martha Nussbaum. Alternatively, the work may have been dedicated to his father, who was also called Nicomachus. Aristotle notes that the type of friendship most likely to be hurt by complaints of unfairness is that of utility and reminds that "the objects and the personal relationships with which friendship is concerned appear [...] to be the same as those which are the sphere of justice. But Aristotle compares tyrants to children, and argues that play and relaxation are best seen not as ends in themselves, but as activities for the sake of more serious living. J.-C.) est aujourd'hui très contestée. Aristote Éthique à Nicomaque Traduction (1959) J. Tricot (1893-1963) Éditions Les Échos du Maquis, v. : 1,0, janvier 2014. Cowardice for example, might specifically cause a soldier to throw away his shield and run. Secondly, according to Aristotle's way of analyzing causation, a good or bad thing can either be an activity ("being at work", energeia), or else a stable disposition (hexis). Justice in such a simple and complete and effective sense would according to Aristotle be the same as having a complete ethical virtue, a perfection of character, because this would be someone who is not just virtuous, but also willing and able to put virtue to use amongst their friends and in their community. It is more like seeing which is either happening in a complete way or not happening. (The disdain of a great souled person towards all kinds of non-human good things can make great souled people seem arrogant, like an un-deserving vain person. This page was last edited on 5 May 2021, at 11:52. Intemperance is a more willingly chosen vice than cowardice, because it positively seeks pleasure, while cowardice avoids pain, and pain can derange a person's choice. It is not like in the productive arts, where the thing being made is what is judged as well made or not. This can be contrasted with several translations, sometimes confusingly treating, However Aristotle himself seems to choose this formulation as a basic starting point because it is already well-known. The refined and active way of politics, which aims at honor, (honor itself implying the higher divinity of those who are wise and know and judge, and potentially honor, political people).

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